# # File Thunder — Architecture & Design Guide V2 ### NexGate Media Engine | Version 2.0 > v2 integrates the media-security refinements worked out in design review. > Every change from v1 is tagged inline as **[v2 FIX]** so it can be reviewed individually. > Section 0 lists all of them in one place — read that first. --- ## 0. What changed in v2 (read this first) These are the careful corrections. Each is explained in full in its section. 1. **Signing is three tiers, not two.** "Public = unsigned, private = signed" was wrong. Correct model: trivial public assets unsigned; *public content* (full images/videos) **signed even though public**; private/paid signed + auth. → §8 2. **Public content gets signed too.** A signed URL is anti-scrape / anti-hotlink, *not* only access control. TikTok signs even public videos. → §8, §14 3. **The visibility-bypass hole must be closed.** In v1, media URLs were permanent and unsigned, so a PRIVATE post's bytes were reachable by anyone with the link — the post was hidden by the API but the file was not. Fixed by locking the bucket (no public-read) and routing everything through signed CDN URLs. → §14 4. **Backend signs, CDN validates, they never talk at sign time.** Signing is pure math on `(path + expiry + secret)`. No file, no CDN contact. CDN fetches from MinIO lazily on first view. → §9 5. **Domain is `media.nexgate.co`, not `.com`.** v1 mixed both. One domain everywhere. → §10 6. **Object keys must be owner-correct.** v1 had one user's avatar stored under another user's prefix. The owner segment in the key must match the real owner. → §3 7. **Store the `objectKey`, never the signed URL.** Signed URLs are minted per request and thrown away. Never persisted in the DB or feed cache. → §13, §22 8. **MP4 and HLS use different token strategies.** Short MP4 = one signed URL. Long HLS = dual-token (short manifest + long segments) or prefix-signing, so playback never dies mid-video. → §11 9. **Single-use is for downloads only, never streams.** A stream is many requests; single-use would break playback. Streams use short expiry + user-binding instead. → §11, §12 10. **Watermarked file is NEVER in the feed response.** Feed = clean playback URLs only. Watermarked download comes from a *separate* endpoint, minted on tap. → §12, §13 11. **Cache gotcha: never cache a signed object keyed by its signature.** A cached object can outlive its stamp; private/paid content must bypass shared cache. → §10, §11 12. **Bot gate is the missing half of anti-scraping.** Signed URLs stop *permanent* theft; the bot gate stops the *act* of mass-pulling. v1 had no bot gate section. → §14 13. **Open decision parked: NextGate's moat (content vs commerce)** drives how hard to stamp public media and how heavy the bot gate needs to be. → §30 --- ## 1. What is File Thunder? File Thunder is NexGate's dedicated media processing engine — a standalone Spring Boot microservice responsible for all file and media operations across the platform. **Core principle:** The Main Backend never touches raw files. It delegates all media operations to File Thunder and acts as a thin client. **Responsibilities:** receive uploads, validate (type/size/quota), virus scan, transcode, generate variants (thumbnails, WebP, HLS, MP4), watermark, store in MinIO, serve via CDN, mint signed delivery URLs, publish media-ready events. **Not:** AI/ML, recommendation, social graph, payments, auth, business logic. --- ## 2. The Four Wheels ``` FILE THUNDER ┌───────────┬───────────┬───────────┬───────────┐ │ FFmpeg │ ImageMagic│ ClamAV │ MinIO │ │ (video) │ (images) │ (security)│ (storage) │ └───────────┴───────────┴───────────┴───────────┘ transcode resize + virus object HLS, w/mark WebP, blur scan store + CDN ``` - **FFmpeg (Jaffree)** — transcode, HLS segmenting, thumbnail/best-frame, 3s preview, watermark overlay, blur-pad, fMP4, format conversion, audio extract/normalize. - **ImageMagick (IM4Java)** — resize variants, format→WebP, EXIF strip (privacy), auto-orient, dominant color, LQIP, OG image, GIF→WebP, PDF→preview. Plus `blurhash-java`. - **ClamAV** — virus scan every upload (TCP `clamav:3310`), hash-cache, digital products scanned twice. - **MinIO** — S3-compatible storage, presigned direct uploads, origin for Cloudflare, multipart + byte-range, lifecycle policies. **Never publicly exposed** (only Cloudflare + File Thunder reach it). --- ## 3. Storage Architecture (MinIO Buckets) **Rule: 4 buckets total. Never one bucket per user.** ``` nexgate-raw/ ← temporary upload landing (auto-delete 24h) nexgate-public/ ← social content (avatars, posts, stories, events, shops) nexgate-private/ ← DMs, documents, KYC, temp audio nexgate-digital/ ← purchase-gated products ``` ### Object Key Pattern ``` {bucket}/{domain}/{ownerId}/{entityId}/{fileId}/{variant} nexgate-public/posts/usr_123/post_456/file_789/720p_clean.mp4 nexgate-private/messages/conv_abc/file_789/original.jpg nexgate-digital/products/shop_xyz/prod_123/file_789/original/file.pdf ``` > **[v2 FIX] Owner-correct keys.** The `{ownerId}` segment MUST be the real owner of the > file. v1 had cases where one user's avatar lived under a different user's prefix — that > leaks identity and misattributes ownership. The owner in the key = the owner in the DB. > Keys are otherwise opaque (no usernames, no PII). ### nexgate-public layout (unchanged from v1) ``` profiles/{userId}/{fileId}/ avatar_400.webp, avatar_150.webp, avatar_50.webp, cover.webp posts/{userId}/{fileId}/ {360,720,1080}p_clean.mp4, {360,720,1080}p_watermarked.mp4, preview_3s.mp4, hls/master.m3u8, hls/{360,720,1080}p/seg_*.ts, thumbnail.webp, og_clean.webp, og_play.webp, og_preview.mp4 stories/{userId}/{fileId}/ 720p_clean.mp4, thumbnail.webp events/{accountId}/{eventId}/{fileId}/ banner.webp, banner_mobile.webp, banner_thumb.webp shops/{shopId}/{productId}/{fileId}/ large.webp, medium.webp, thumb.webp ``` *(See §12 for the watermarked-variant storage decision — store one rung, not all three.)* ### nexgate-private / nexgate-digital As v1: messages, documents, kyc, temp audio (private); products with `original/` (never exposed) + `preview/` + `cover/` (digital). --- ## 4. Accepted File Formats - **Images** accept JPEG/PNG/HEIC/WebP/GIF; reject BMP/TIFF/RAW/SVG (SVG = security risk). Output always **WebP**. - **Videos** accept MP4/MOV/MKV/WEBM/AVI/3GP; reject WMV/FLV/VOB. Output **H.264 MP4** (short) or **HLS H.264** (long). - **Digital** PDF, DOCX/XLSX/PPTX, GLB/OBJ/FBX/STL, MP3/WAV/FLAC, ZIP/RAR, PSD/AI, PNG. --- ## 5. Upload Flow ``` [1] Client-side intelligent compression (max 1080p, CRF 18 light, HEIC→JPEG) [2] POST /media/upload-request { fileName, fileSize, mimeType, directory, clientMeta } [3] File Thunder: validate MIME + size + quota (atomic SQL) → DB record PENDING → presigned MinIO URL (nexgate-raw) → { fileId, uploadUrl, expiresIn: 1800 } [4] Client uploads directly to MinIO (TUS resumable / multipart >5MB) [5] Client confirms POST /media/confirm { fileId } (cleanup job recovers if missed) [6] Processing pipeline starts ``` ``` client compress │ ▼ POST upload-request ──▶ validate + quota ──▶ presigned URL │ ▼ upload direct to MinIO (raw) │ ▼ confirm ──▶ ClamAV ──▶ dedup ──▶ process ──▶ READY │ ▼ RabbitMQ media.ready ──▶ Main Backend ``` **Quota** checked at presigned-URL time (atomic `UPDATE ... WHERE used+size <= quota`). **Duration** checked AFTER upload via FFprobe (client value is a hint, not trusted) — over limit → delete from raw, release quota, 403 `DURATION_EXCEEDED`. ### Per-Upload Limits | Plan | Image | Short Video | Long Video | Digital Video | Duration | |------|-------|-------------|------------|---------------|----------| | FREE | 20MB | 200MB | ❌ | ❌ | 5 min | | PRO | 20MB | 500MB | 2GB | 5GB | 60 min | | BUSINESS | 20MB | 2GB | 5GB | 20GB | Unlimited | --- ## 6. Processing Pipelines (summary) All pipelines: **ClamAV scan → SHA-256 dedup check → process → store → delete raw → DB READY → publish events.** Watermarking and all placeholders are generated **here, at processing time**, never at serve time. ### 6.1 Image Auto-orient → strip EXIF (privacy) → NSFW check → dominant color + LQIP + BlurHash → size variants per content type (Post: 1600/800/300; Profile: 400/150/50; Product: 1000/500/200 square; Event: 1200×630/800×420) → WebP → OG image → store public → READY. ### 6.2 Short Video (MP4, duration < 3 min) FFprobe → adaptive transcode decision (never upscale, never inflate) → **fast lane** (quick 360p → `LIVE_PARTIAL`) → full processing: - **Clean** variants `{360,720,1080}p_clean.mp4` (faststart). Non-9:16 reel-eligible → **blur-pad** to 9:16 (scale-fill+blur background, scale-fit sharp foreground, overlay). - **Watermarked** variant(s) — **moving** watermark (jumps corners every 3s; 80×80 logo 60% opacity + username; app-based label from `clientApp`). **[v2 FIX] store one download rung (720p), not all three** (§12). - Extras: `thumbnail.webp` (best-frame scored) + its LQIP/BlurHash/dominantColor, `preview_3s.mp4` (360p muted watermarked), `og_clean.webp`, `og_play.webp`, `og_preview.mp4`. - fMP4 (`frag_keyframe+empty_moov+faststart`) for byte-range. - Extract `audio.wav` → nexgate-private (Rec Engine). - READY: `isReelEligible` (<3min), `streamingFormat: MP4`, variants JSONB, aspectRatio, qualityScore, duration. ### 6.3 Long Video (HLS, duration ≥ 3 min) Same as short EXCEPT: HLS adaptive (no fast lane — stays PROCESSING until done). `hls/{360,720,1080}p/` segments + `master.m3u8`. Segment = 2s, H.264 + AAC, MPEG-TS. Still makes preview_3s, thumbnail, placeholders, OG. `isReelEligible: false`, `streamingFormat: HLS`. ### 6.4 Digital Products Double ClamAV scan → SHA-256 checksum → light preview by type (PDF p1 watermarked, video first 2min 480p watermarked, audio 30s 96kbps, 3D multi-angle thumbs, image 600px watermarked) → store `original/` (never exposed) + `preview/` + `cover/` → READY. ### 6.5 DM Attachments nexgate-private, **no CDN**, conversation-membership check, thumb+original only, no watermark, no reel pool, signed 5-min URLs. Virus scanned like everything. --- ## 7. Watermarking Strategy - **Applied at processing time, once.** Stored as separate `_watermarked` variant. Never at serve time, never client-side. - **Moving watermark** (corners every 3s) — static is croppable, moving is not. - **Served:** in-app playback → **clean** variant; download button → **watermarked** variant (§12). Direct CDN URL → clean (unavoidable; accepted, same tradeoff every platform has). - Pre-watermarked uploads (from other platforms): Phase 1 = no detection, just overlay ours. Phase 3 = AI logo detection → suppress reach (Instagram model), never block. - Username change: old videos keep old username (like TikTok). > **[v2 FIX] Honest scope.** A watermark does NOT prevent download — it survives download. > Its job is attribution + traceability, not prevention. The clean file is reachable by a > determined ripper via the playback URL; that's accepted. Goal = "not worth the effort for > 99% + traceable if they do." --- ## 8. The Three Delivery Tiers **[v2 FIX — core correction]** v1 assumed two levels (public unsigned / private signed). Correct model is **three**: | Tier | Content | Login to view? | URL signed? | Expiry | CDN cache | |------|---------|----------------|-------------|--------|-----------| | 1 — trivial public | avatars, thumbnails, posters, blur previews | no | **no** | n/a | aggressive, 1y | | 2 — public content | full post images, video rungs | no | **YES** | hours | careful (§10) | | 3 — private / paid | DM media, private posts, digital products, KYC | **yes** | YES | minutes | none / private | ``` ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ TIER 1 trivial public │ │ avatars, thumbs → unsigned, cache 1y │ ├──────────────────────────────────────────────┤ │ TIER 2 public content │ │ full images/video → SIGNED, hrs TTL │ ├──────────────────────────────────────────────┤ │ TIER 3 private / paid │ │ DM, private, digital → SIGNED + auth + x-uid │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────┘ only diff T2 vs T3 = auth check before minting ``` The key insight: **"public to view" and "signed URL" are independent.** Tier 2 content is open to watch by anyone (no login), but the *file* is still signed — because signing is **anti-scrape / anti-hotlink**, not access control. This is exactly TikTok's model (public video, yet the raw file link expires and 403s). The only difference between tier 2 and tier 3 in code is **whether an auth/visibility check runs before minting** — the signing itself is identical. > Tier 1 is the only unsigned tier. Anything a scraper would actually *want* (full media) > is tier 2+, i.e. signed. --- ## 9. Signed URLs — how they actually work **[v2 — new, the mechanism]** A signed URL = a normal link with a **stamp** made from three things: ``` stamp (x-sig) = HMAC(secret, path + expiry) ``` - `path` — the object key being requested - `expiry` (`x-expires`) — unix time the link dies - `secret` — a key known ONLY to File Thunder/backend AND the CDN. Never in the URL, browser, or JSON. Lives in Vault. **Who does what, and when — three separate moments:** 1. **Upload time:** File Thunder makes the variants, stores them in MinIO. CDN not involved. 2. **Feed-build time (signing):** backend computes `x-sig` from `(path + expiry + secret)`. **Pure string math — no file opened, no CDN contacted, no storage touched.** It's just writing a stamped link. (You can sign a path whose bytes don't even exist yet — the math only sees the string.) 3. **Playback time (serving):** the phone requests the stamped URL → CDN re-computes the stamp with its copy of the secret. Match + not expired → serve. First viewer: CDN lazily fetches the file from MinIO and caches it. Later viewers: served from cache. ``` upload feed build playback ┌────────┐ store ┌──────────┐ stamped ┌──────────┐ │ File │ ───────▶ │ Backend │ ─ link ──▶ │ CDN │ │ Thunder│ to MinIO │ signs │ │ validates│ └────────┘ └──────────┘ └────┬─────┘ secret ▲ │ first view Vault └──────── same ────────┘ fetch+cache secret from MinIO ``` **Tamper resistance** (why a stripped/edited link fails): - No sig → CDN rejects (paths require a valid sig) → 403. - Fake sig → recompute doesn't match → 403. - Edited expiry → sig was computed *from* the old expiry, no longer matches → 403. - Swapped path → sig bound to original path → 403. - Untouched + in time → serve. After `x-expires` → even the real link 403s. Forging anything requires the **secret**, which never leaves backend + CDN. Protect the secret (Vault) and the whole scheme holds. **You don't write the HMAC.** The MinIO SDK (or CDN signer) does it in one call: ```java // ── Mint a signed delivery URL ── String url = minioClient.getPresignedObjectUrl( GetPresignedObjectUrlArgs.builder() .method(Method.GET) .bucket(bucket) .object(objectKey) .expiry(seconds, TimeUnit.SECONDS) // → x-expires + x-sig .build()); ``` --- ## 10. URL Strategy ### Tier 1 — trivial public → permanent, unsigned, cache hard ``` https://media.nexgate.co/profiles/usr_123/avatar_400.webp https://media.nexgate.co/posts/usr_123/vid_789/thumbnail.webp ``` `Cache-Control: public, max-age=31536000`. Scraping these gains nothing. ### Tier 2 — public content → signed, short-ish expiry ``` https://media.nexgate.co/posts/usr_123/vid_789/720p_clean.mp4?x-expires=1780297200&x-sig=8f3a9c ``` ### Tier 3 — private / paid → signed + user-bound + auth check first ``` https://media.nexgate.co/private/messages/conv_abc/file_789/original.jpg ?x-expires=...&x-sig=...&x-uid=usr_xyz ``` > **[v2 FIX] Domain is `.co`.** All URLs use `media.nexgate.co`. v1 mixed `.com`/`.co` — > that produces broken links. One domain everywhere. > **[v2 FIX] Cache-key gotcha.** Never let the CDN cache a signed object using a cache key > that includes `x-sig`/`x-uid` — you'd fragment cache per user, and a cached object can > outlive its stamp (origin checks expiry, but a cache hit never reaches origin). Rules: > tier 1 cache hard; tier 2 cache by **path only** (strip query from cache key), short edge > TTL; tier 3 **never** on shared cache. ### Signed URL params | Param | Purpose | |-------|---------| | `x-expires` | link dies after TTL | | `x-sig` | HMAC tamper protection | | `x-uid` | bound to user (tier 3) — shared link won't work for someone else | ### Who generates / validates Backend (has secret) **generates**. Cloudflare edge (same secret) **validates**. MinIO never seen by clients. --- ## 11. Streaming Token Strategy: MP4 vs HLS **[v2 — new]** Expiry is checked **when each request opens**, not continuously. An in-flight transfer completes even if the clock passes mid-download. The two formats differ because of how many requests a single playback makes. ``` SHORT MP4 LONG HLS one request hundreds of requests ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──┬──┬──┬──┐ │ 720p.mp4 │ ← 1 signed URL │master.m3u│─▶│ts│ts│ts│..│ └──────────┘ few-hr TTL └──────────┘ └──┴──┴──┴──┘ opens once, short token long token rides to end (~1 min) (> video len) per-session one, shared ``` ### Short video (MP4) — one signed URL One file = one request (or a few byte-ranges, all opened up front). A few-hour expiry is plenty; the in-flight request completes, so mid-play expiry basically never happens. → mint one signed URL per rung, few-hour TTL. **No dual-token, no single-use.** ### Long video (HLS) — dual-token (or prefix-signed) HLS = hundreds of segment requests (one every ~2s), so expiry is re-checked constantly. A single short token would die mid-video. Industry-standard fix (Google Media CDN / CloudFront): - **`master.m3u8`** → **short** token (~1 min). Per-session entry gate. Fetched once at start. - **child manifests + `.ts` segments** → **long** token (> full video length, up to ~1 day), carried by **signed cookie** or **path-prefix signing** (sign the folder, not each segment). - Segments stay **cacheable** (same bytes for everyone); only the manifest is per-session. Preserves cache hit rate. > At our stage on Cloudflare Free/Pro, do the simpler version: backend mints a **long > prefix-signed** token for the whole `hls/` folder when the post loads. Graduate to true > edge dual-token (short→long exchange) if/when we move to a heavier CDN. ### Single-use — downloads ONLY, never streams A stream is many requests; making the token single-use would 403 the viewer one segment in. **Streams use short expiry + `x-uid` binding instead.** Single-use (Redis) is correct only for one-file-one-request **downloads** (§12, digital products). ### Edge case (both formats) User pauses past expiry, then seeks → player fires a fresh request with a dead URL → 403. **Client safety net:** catch the 403, silently re-fetch a fresh URL from backend, resume. | | Short MP4 | Long HLS | |--|-----------|----------| | Requests / play | one (few byte-ranges) | hundreds | | Token | single signed URL | dual-token / prefix-signed | | TTL | few hours | > watch duration | | Single-use | no | no | --- ## 12. Watermark & Download Path **[v2 FIX]** Decision: **Option B — downloads are watermarked.** (Full build, not the launch shortcut.) **The feed NEVER contains a watermarked URL.** Feed = clean playback URLs only. Watermarked download is a **separate endpoint**, minted on tap. ``` User taps Download → GET /media/{fileId}/download?quality=720p (quality optional, default 720p) → backend: check canDownload (post setting) + tier (private/paid → auth check) → mint signed URL → {quality}_watermarked.mp4 short TTL (~10 min), x-uid bound, single-use (Redis x-once) → log download event (orderId/buyerId/ip/device/country if digital) → return { downloadUrl, expiresIn, singleUse: true } Client downloads. URL marked used in Redis → 403 on reuse. ``` **Default quality, no picker (short video).** Serve one default rung (**720p**) — matches TikTok/IG, sane on TZ data. Endpoint takes optional `quality` so a picker is an additive change later (long-form only, where the size gap matters). **Storage decision:** store **one** watermarked rung (720p), not all three. If a picker is added later, **lazy-generate** other rungs on first request and cache — only spend CPU/storage on a quality someone actually downloads. **Timing:** watermarked 720p is generated at **processing time** (pre-ready), so download is instant — no first-user FFmpeg penalty. ```java // ── Download endpoint (picker-ready, single-use, watermarked) ── @GetMapping("/media/{fileId}/download") ResponseEntity download(@PathVariable String fileId, @RequestParam(defaultValue = "720p") String quality, @AuthenticationPrincipal AccountEntity user) { MediaEntity m = mediaService.findReady(fileId); // ── access gate (tier 2 = open; tier 3 = ownership/visibility) ── if (!m.isCanDownload()) return ResponseEntity.status(403).build(); if (m.isRestricted() && !accessService.canAccess(user, m)) return ResponseEntity.status(403).build(); // ── mint watermarked, user-bound, single-use URL ── String key = m.watermarkedKey(quality); // lazy-generate if absent String url = mediaService.mintDownloadUrl(key, user.getId(), Duration.ofMinutes(10)); downloadLog.record(fileId, user, request); // audit return ResponseEntity.ok(Map.of("downloadUrl", url, "expiresIn", 600, "singleUse", true)); } ``` --- ## 13. Feed Response Shape **[v2 — new]** Rules baked in: - **Batch-mint inline.** While building the page (already looping posts), mint every signed URL right there — no per-item round trip from the client. - **Store `objectKey`, mint URL per request.** Never persist a signed URL (it expires). - **Tier 1 unsigned** (avatar, thumb, poster, preview3s); **tier 2 signed** (full image, video rungs). - **Placeholders filled** (blurhash, lqip, dominantColor) + `width`/`height`/`duration` present. - **No watermarked URL here** (§12). `canDownload` flag tells the client whether to show the button. ```json { "data": [{ "id": "0e67aef4-...", "author": { "id": "ad03431a-...", "userName": "juliusdev_", "verified": true, "profilePictureUrl": "https://media.nexgate.co/profiles/ad03431a-.../avatar_400.webp" }, "content": "Testing video media post 🎬", "shareCode": "waBbP82h", "media": [{ "id": "436bb62b-...", "mediaType": "VIDEO", "status": "READY", "width": 1080, "height": 1920, "aspectRatio": "9:16", "duration": 28, "isReelEligible": true, "streamingFormat": "MP4", "canDownload": true, "dominantColor": "#1a1a2e", "blurhash": "L6Pj0^i_.AyE_3t7t7R**0o#DgR4", "lqip": "...", "poster": "https://media.nexgate.co/posts/ad03431a-.../436bb62b-.../thumbnail.webp", "preview3s": "https://media.nexgate.co/posts/ad03431a-.../436bb62b-.../preview_3s.mp4", "variants": { "360p": "https://media.nexgate.co/posts/ad03431a-.../436bb62b-.../360p_clean.mp4?x-expires=1780297200&x-sig=a1f2b3", "720p": "https://media.nexgate.co/posts/ad03431a-.../436bb62b-.../720p_clean.mp4?x-expires=1780297200&x-sig=b2e3c4", "1080p": "https://media.nexgate.co/posts/ad03431a-.../436bb62b-.../1080p_clean.mp4?x-expires=1780297200&x-sig=c3f4d5" }, "order": 1 }], "privacySettings": { "visibility": "PUBLIC" } }] } ``` *(HLS video: `streamingFormat: "HLS"`, replace `variants` with a single signed/prefix-signed `master.m3u8`.)* --- ## 14. Security & Anti-Scraping **[v2 — expanded]** ### 14.1 Close the visibility-bypass hole v1's permanent unsigned URLs meant a PRIVATE post's bytes were reachable by anyone with the link — the API hid the post, the file did not. **Fix:** 1. Remove **public-read** from MinIO buckets (already a stated rule — enforce it). 2. Route all access through signed CDN URLs. 3. Private/followers/DM/paid → tier 3 (auth check before minting + `x-uid`). After this, a hidden post's media returns 403 to anyone but the authorized viewer. ### 14.2 Two layers, both required - **Signed URLs** stop *permanent* theft: scraped links die in hours → no permanent mirror, no hotlinking. **They do NOT stop a one-time download** — a valid link is a valid link. - **Bot gate** stops the *act* of mass-pulling: it guards the **feed API door** so a bot can't cheaply pull fresh links over and over. - **Neither alone is enough. Together** = scraping isn't worth it. (You cannot make it impossible — the goal is "not worth the effort for 99%, traceable if they do.") ### 14.3 Bot gate (the missing half) — sized to moat (§30) - **App attestation** — the real app computes a hard-to-fake token (TikTok's `X-Bogus`/`msToken` equivalent). A plain script can't produce it without running app code. - **Rate limiting** — one "user" pulling thousands of posts/min = bot → throttle/block. - **Auth + behaviour** — require login; flag inhuman scroll/pull patterns. - **Escalating friction** — suspicious traffic → CAPTCHA / slowdown / ban. > **Build depth depends on the moat decision (§30).** Commerce-moat → lighter bot gate is > fine for launch. Content-moat → invest earlier. ### 14.4 Protection layers (reference) `Content-Disposition: inline` · dynamic URL via JS · signed expiring URLs · session/device binding · disable right-click (frontend) · watermark on download · HLS chunking. --- ## 15. OG (Open Graph) Strategy OG images + `og_preview.mp4` are **permanent, unsigned, tier 1** — because crawlers (WhatsApp/Telegram) fetch on share and the user may open hours later; a signed URL would expire → "Error loading." Access control for private posts is enforced **server-side** (the post page returns 403), not via the OG asset. Serve `og_clean.webp` to known platforms, `og_play.webp` (burned play button) to unknown crawlers (User-Agent detection). --- ## 16. Compression & Transcoding (reference) Client: light pre-compress (max 1080p, CRF 18, never upscale). Server: FFprobe → adaptive ladder (never upscale, never inflate → `-c:v copy` if output > input). CRF 21/23/25/28 for 1080/720/480/360, 30 for OG preview. 1080p max (all platforms serve ≤1080p anyway). `-movflags +faststart` always; `frag_keyframe+empty_moov+faststart` for fMP4. Now: H.264 + AAC. Future: AV1 + Opus + CMAF. --- ## 17. BlurHash, LQIP & Dominant Color Generated for every image + video thumbnail, at processing time. Progressive load: dominantColor (0ms) → BlurHash (0ms) → LQIP (0ms) → thumb.webp (CDN) → full on tap. All three stored in `media_content_signals` and shipped inline in the feed JSON. --- ## 18. Deduplication SHA-256 on raw file → `file_hashes`. Exists+clean → skip processing, reference existing variants, `reference_count++`. Delete → decrement; 0 → remove from MinIO. Near-dup (pHash) = future (copyright). --- ## 19. Quota Management Enforced at **presigned-URL generation** (atomic SQL). Social = original size charged; digital = all stored bytes. Plans: FREE 1GB / PRO 20GB / BUSINESS 100GB. Warn 80%/95%/100%. Release on abandoned (immediate) and hard-delete (30d after soft). Redis cache, sync to PG every 5 min. --- ## 20. Storage Lifecycle raw: auto-delete 24h. public: keep forever, access-based tiering (hot NVMe → warm HDD → cold; viral old content auto-promotes). private: DM 1y, audio 24h, KYC per law. digital: forever. Soft delete → 30d grace → hard delete + Cloudflare purge + quota free. --- ## 21. Abandoned Upload Handling Layer 1: client confirm (fast path). Layer 2: cleanup job every 30 min (PENDING >1h → file exists = recover/process; not = abandoned, release quota). Layer 3: raw lifecycle 24h. `fileId` in object key enables recovery without confirm. Redis distributed lock on the job. --- ## 22. Progress Tracking (SSE) SSE (one-way, auto-reconnect, resilient on TZ networks). Redis key `upload_status:{fileId}`: PENDING→UPLOADING→UPLOADED→SCANNING→PROCESSING→LIVE_PARTIAL→READY (or FAILED/QUARANTINED/ ABANDONED). Multi-instance via Redis Pub/Sub bridging emitters. --- ## 23. Communication Architecture No direct HTTP between services. **RabbitMQ** (FT ↔ Main Backend, topic `nexgate.media`): `media.upload.request`, `media.upload.url.ready`, `media.ready`, `media.live.partial`, `media.failed`, `media.quarantined`, `digital.product.ready`. **Kafka** (FT → Rec Engine / Analytics, topic `content.new`). > **[v2 FIX] Events carry `objectKey`s + variants, not signed URLs.** `MEDIA_READY` ships > storage keys (e.g. `posts/usr_123/vid_789/720p_clean.mp4`) + placeholders. The Main > Backend mints signed URLs **per feed request** from those keys — it never stores a signed > URL. --- ## 24. CDN Strategy Cloudflare in front of MinIO. First request → edge → MinIO → cache → serve; thereafter from cache. Cache-Control: tier 1 = 1y; tier 2 = path-keyed short edge TTL; tier 3 / API = `private, no-store`. **MinIO never publicly exposed** (only Cloudflare IPs). Phases: Free → Pro ($20) → R2 (zero egress). See §10 cache-key gotcha. --- ## 25. Shareable Links Client-side `nexgate.co/reels/{shareCode}?ref=whatsapp`. No `uid` in URL (server resolves owner from shareCode → follow prompt). `ref` drives share analytics. Public content = no token needed for the page; the **media** on the page still follows tier rules (§8). --- ## 26. Technology Stack Java 21 / Spring Boot 3.x · FFmpeg (Jaffree) · ImageMagick (IM4Java) · blurhash-java · ClamAV (Docker, TCP 3310) · MinIO · Cloudflare · RabbitMQ · Kafka · Redis · PostgreSQL · TUS · **Vault (`vault.qbitspark.com`) — holds the signing secret** · Docker Compose · SSE. --- ## 27. Database Schema (key tables + v2 notes) ```sql media_files ( file_id UUID PK, owner_id UUID, directory ENUM, original_name TEXT, object_key TEXT, -- canonical storage key [v2: keys, never signed URLs] mime_type TEXT, file_size BIGINT, status ENUM, -- PENDING..READY..QUARANTINED..ABANDONED variants JSONB, -- variant object_keys (NOT URLs) metadata JSONB, scan_result TEXT, hash TEXT, is_reel_eligible BOOLEAN, streaming_format ENUM, can_download BOOLEAN DEFAULT true, -- [v2] drives feed canDownload + download gate created_at TIMESTAMPTZ, ready_at TIMESTAMPTZ ); media_content_signals ( file_id UUID FK, has_audio BOOLEAN, audio_ref TEXT, dominant_color TEXT, blurhash TEXT, lqip TEXT, aspect_ratio TEXT, quality_score INT, width INT, height INT, duration_seconds DECIMAL ); -- user_storage_quota, file_hashes, media_variants (HOT/WARM/COLD), -- digital_product_files, digital_orders, digital_download_logs (as v1) ``` Indexes: `idx_media_cleanup (created_at) WHERE status='PENDING'`; unique `file_hashes(hash)`; `media_files(owner_id, status, created_at DESC)`. > **[v2 FIX] No `signed_url` column anywhere.** Signed URLs are minted per request and > discarded. The DB stores only `object_key` + `variants` (keys). --- ## 28. Docker & Infrastructure (reference) `eclipse-temurin:21` + ffmpeg + imagemagick(+webp/heic). ClamAV separate container (daemon, auto-updates). FT: 4 cores / 16GB (FFmpeg CPU-heavy). ClamAV: 1 core / 2GB. Env: PG, Redis, RabbitMQ, Kafka, MinIO, ClamAV, `VAULT_ADDR`. --- ## 29. What File Thunder Does NOT Do ❌ ML/AI classification · Whisper (Rec Engine) · CLIP · feed ranking · social graph · payments · auth · push · search · business logic · fan-out · recommendations. Extracts `audio.wav` temporarily; Rec Engine fetches/transcribes/deletes. FT never knows audio content. --- ## 30. Open Decisions (parked) 1. **Moat: content vs commerce?** *This drives §14.3 (bot-gate depth) and §8 (how hard to stamp tier-2 public media).* If commerce is the moat (shops/payments/events), public media scraping hurts less → lighter bot gate, tier-2 stamping is softer/optional. If content is the moat → invest in bot gate + stamp tier-2 firmly. **Decide before finalizing anti-scraping work.** 2. **Bot gate depth for launch** — minimum: login + rate limit. Full app-attestation later, sized to (1). 3. **HLS dual-token vs prefix-sign for launch** — prefix-sign on Cloudflare now; edge dual-token if/when heavier CDN (§11). 4. **Download quality picker** — default 720p now; picker + lazy-gen later (§12). --- ## Summary — File Thunder v2 in one line > Receives raw files → ClamAV → processes into clean + watermarked variants (FFmpeg/IM) with > blurhash/lqip/dominant-color → stores **object keys** across 4 buckets in MinIO (never > public-read) → the Main Backend **mints signed delivery URLs per request** from those keys > using a three-tier policy (trivial-public unsigned, public-content signed, private/paid > signed + auth) → Cloudflare serves and caches by tier → streams use MP4-single-URL or > HLS-dual-token, downloads use single-use watermarked URLs → signed URLs + a bot gate > together make scraping not worth the effort — all without business logic, ML, or social ops. --- *File Thunder Architecture Guide v2.0 — NexGate / QBIT SPARK* *v2 integrates media-security design review. [v2 FIX] tags mark every change from v1.*