# File Thunder — Architecture & Design Guide V2

NexGate Media Engine | Version 2.0

v2 integrates the media-security refinements worked out in design review. Every change from v1 is tagged inline as [v2 FIX] so it can be reviewed individually. Section 0 lists all of them in one place — read that first.

0. What changed in v2 (read this first)

These are the careful corrections. Each is explained in full in its section.

  1. Signing is three tiers, not two. "Public = unsigned, private = signed" was wrong. Correct model: trivial public assets unsigned; public content (full images/videos) signed even though public; private/paid signed + auth. → §8
  2. Public content gets signed too. A signed URL is anti-scrape / anti-hotlink, not only access control. TikTok signs even public videos. → §8, §14
  3. The visibility-bypass hole must be closed. In v1, media URLs were permanent and unsigned, so a PRIVATE post's bytes were reachable by anyone with the link — the post was hidden by the API but the file was not. Fixed by locking the bucket (no public-read) and routing everything through signed CDN URLs. → §14
  4. Backend signs, CDN validates, they never talk at sign time. Signing is pure math on (path + expiry + secret). No file, no CDN contact. CDN fetches from MinIO lazily on first view. → §9
  5. Domain is media.nexgate.co, not .com. v1 mixed both. One domain everywhere. → §10
  6. Object keys must be owner-correct. v1 had one user's avatar stored under another user's prefix. The owner segment in the key must match the real owner. → §3
  7. Store the objectKey, never the signed URL. Signed URLs are minted per request and thrown away. Never persisted in the DB or feed cache. → §13, §22
  8. MP4 and HLS use different token strategies. Short MP4 = one signed URL. Long HLS = dual-token (short manifest + long segments) or prefix-signing, so playback never dies mid-video. → §11
  9. Single-use is for downloads only, never streams. A stream is many requests; single-use would break playback. Streams use short expiry + user-binding instead. → §11, §12
  10. Watermarked file is NEVER in the feed response. Feed = clean playback URLs only. Watermarked download comes from a separate endpoint, minted on tap. → §12, §13
  11. Cache gotcha: never cache a signed object keyed by its signature. A cached object can outlive its stamp; private/paid content must bypass shared cache. → §10, §11
  12. Bot gate is the missing half of anti-scraping. Signed URLs stop permanent theft; the bot gate stops the act of mass-pulling. v1 had no bot gate section. → §14
  13. Open decision parked: NextGate's moat (content vs commerce) drives how hard to stamp public media and how heavy the bot gate needs to be. → §30

1. What is File Thunder?

File Thunder is NexGate's dedicated media processing engine — a standalone Spring Boot microservice responsible for all file and media operations across the platform.

Core principle: The Main Backend never touches raw files. It delegates all media operations to File Thunder and acts as a thin client.

Responsibilities: receive uploads, validate (type/size/quota), virus scan, transcode, generate variants (thumbnails, WebP, HLS, MP4), watermark, store in MinIO, serve via CDN, mint signed delivery URLs, publish media-ready events.

Not: AI/ML, recommendation, social graph, payments, auth, business logic.

2. The Four Wheels

                        FILE THUNDER
        ┌───────────┬───────────┬───────────┬───────────┐
        │  FFmpeg   │ ImageMagic│  ClamAV   │   MinIO   │
        │  (video)  │ (images)  │ (security)│ (storage) │
        └───────────┴───────────┴───────────┴───────────┘
         transcode    resize +    virus       object
         HLS, w/mark  WebP, blur  scan        store + CDN

3. Storage Architecture (MinIO Buckets)

Rule: 4 buckets total. Never one bucket per user.

nexgate-raw/       ← temporary upload landing (auto-delete 24h)
nexgate-public/    ← social content (avatars, posts, stories, events, shops)
nexgate-private/   ← DMs, documents, KYC, temp audio
nexgate-digital/   ← purchase-gated products

Object Key Pattern

{bucket}/{domain}/{ownerId}/{entityId}/{fileId}/{variant}

nexgate-public/posts/usr_123/post_456/file_789/720p_clean.mp4
nexgate-private/messages/conv_abc/file_789/original.jpg
nexgate-digital/products/shop_xyz/prod_123/file_789/original/file.pdf

[v2 FIX] Owner-correct keys. The {ownerId} segment MUST be the real owner of the file. v1 had cases where one user's avatar lived under a different user's prefix — that leaks identity and misattributes ownership. The owner in the key = the owner in the DB. Keys are otherwise opaque (no usernames, no PII).

nexgate-public layout (unchanged from v1)

profiles/{userId}/{fileId}/  avatar_400.webp, avatar_150.webp, avatar_50.webp, cover.webp
posts/{userId}/{fileId}/     {360,720,1080}p_clean.mp4, {360,720,1080}p_watermarked.mp4,
                             preview_3s.mp4, hls/master.m3u8, hls/{360,720,1080}p/seg_*.ts,
                             thumbnail.webp, og_clean.webp, og_play.webp, og_preview.mp4
stories/{userId}/{fileId}/   720p_clean.mp4, thumbnail.webp
events/{accountId}/{eventId}/{fileId}/  banner.webp, banner_mobile.webp, banner_thumb.webp
shops/{shopId}/{productId}/{fileId}/    large.webp, medium.webp, thumb.webp

(See §12 for the watermarked-variant storage decision — store one rung, not all three.)

nexgate-private / nexgate-digital

As v1: messages, documents, kyc, temp audio (private); products with original/ (never exposed) + preview/ + cover/ (digital).

4. Accepted File Formats

5. Upload Flow

[1] Client-side intelligent compression (max 1080p, CRF 18 light, HEIC→JPEG)
[2] POST /media/upload-request { fileName, fileSize, mimeType, directory, clientMeta }
[3] File Thunder: validate MIME + size + quota (atomic SQL) → DB record PENDING
    → presigned MinIO URL (nexgate-raw) → { fileId, uploadUrl, expiresIn: 1800 }
[4] Client uploads directly to MinIO (TUS resumable / multipart >5MB)
[5] Client confirms POST /media/confirm { fileId }   (cleanup job recovers if missed)
[6] Processing pipeline starts

  client compress
        │
        ▼
  POST upload-request ──▶ validate + quota ──▶ presigned URL
        │
        ▼
  upload direct to MinIO (raw)
        │
        ▼
  confirm ──▶ ClamAV ──▶ dedup ──▶ process ──▶ READY
                                      │
                                      ▼
                            RabbitMQ media.ready ──▶ Main Backend

Quota checked at presigned-URL time (atomic UPDATE ... WHERE used+size <= quota). Duration checked AFTER upload via FFprobe (client value is a hint, not trusted) — over limit → delete from raw, release quota, 403 DURATION_EXCEEDED.

Per-Upload Limits

Plan Image Short Video Long Video Digital Video Duration
FREE 20MB 200MB ❌ ❌ 5 min
PRO 20MB 500MB 2GB 5GB 60 min
BUSINESS 20MB 2GB 5GB 20GB Unlimited

6. Processing Pipelines (summary)

All pipelines: ClamAV scan → SHA-256 dedup check → process → store → delete raw → DB READY → publish events. Watermarking and all placeholders are generated here, at processing time, never at serve time.

6.1 Image

Auto-orient → strip EXIF (privacy) → NSFW check → dominant color + LQIP + BlurHash → size variants per content type (Post: 1600/800/300; Profile: 400/150/50; Product: 1000/500/200 square; Event: 1200×630/800×420) → WebP → OG image → store public → READY.

6.2 Short Video (MP4, duration < 3 min)

FFprobe → adaptive transcode decision (never upscale, never inflate) → fast lane (quick 360p → LIVE_PARTIAL) → full processing:

6.3 Long Video (HLS, duration ≥ 3 min)

Same as short EXCEPT: HLS adaptive (no fast lane — stays PROCESSING until done). hls/{360,720,1080}p/ segments + master.m3u8. Segment = 2s, H.264 + AAC, MPEG-TS. Still makes preview_3s, thumbnail, placeholders, OG. isReelEligible: false, streamingFormat: HLS.

6.4 Digital Products

Double ClamAV scan → SHA-256 checksum → light preview by type (PDF p1 watermarked, video first 2min 480p watermarked, audio 30s 96kbps, 3D multi-angle thumbs, image 600px watermarked) → store original/ (never exposed) + preview/ + cover/ → READY.

6.5 DM Attachments

nexgate-private, no CDN, conversation-membership check, thumb+original only, no watermark, no reel pool, signed 5-min URLs. Virus scanned like everything.

7. Watermarking Strategy

[v2 FIX] Honest scope. A watermark does NOT prevent download — it survives download. Its job is attribution + traceability, not prevention. The clean file is reachable by a determined ripper via the playback URL; that's accepted. Goal = "not worth the effort for 99% + traceable if they do."

8. The Three Delivery Tiers [v2 FIX — core correction]

v1 assumed two levels (public unsigned / private signed). Correct model is three:

Tier Content Login to view? URL signed? Expiry CDN cache
1 — trivial public avatars, thumbnails, posters, blur previews no no n/a aggressive, 1y
2 — public content full post images, video rungs no YES hours careful (§10)
3 — private / paid DM media, private posts, digital products, KYC yes YES minutes none / private 
  ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐
  │  TIER 1  trivial public                       │
  │  avatars, thumbs    →  unsigned, cache 1y     │
  ├──────────────────────────────────────────────┤
  │  TIER 2  public content                       │
  │  full images/video  →  SIGNED, hrs TTL        │
  ├──────────────────────────────────────────────┤
  │  TIER 3  private / paid                       │
  │  DM, private, digital → SIGNED + auth + x-uid │
  └──────────────────────────────────────────────┘
   only diff T2 vs T3 = auth check before minting

The key insight: "public to view" and "signed URL" are independent. Tier 2 content is open to watch by anyone (no login), but the file is still signed — because signing is anti-scrape / anti-hotlink, not access control. This is exactly TikTok's model (public video, yet the raw file link expires and 403s).

The only difference between tier 2 and tier 3 in code is whether an auth/visibility check runs before minting — the signing itself is identical.

Tier 1 is the only unsigned tier. Anything a scraper would actually want (full media) is tier 2+, i.e. signed.

9. Signed URLs — how they actually work [v2 — new, the mechanism]

A signed URL = a normal link with a stamp made from three things:

stamp (x-sig) = HMAC(secret, path + expiry)

Who does what, and when — three separate moments:

  1. Upload time: File Thunder makes the variants, stores them in MinIO. CDN not involved.
  2. Feed-build time (signing): backend computes x-sig from (path + expiry + secret). Pure string math — no file opened, no CDN contacted, no storage touched. It's just writing a stamped link. (You can sign a path whose bytes don't even exist yet — the math only sees the string.)
  3. Playback time (serving): the phone requests the stamped URL → CDN re-computes the stamp with its copy of the secret. Match + not expired → serve. First viewer: CDN lazily fetches the file from MinIO and caches it. Later viewers: served from cache.
   upload                feed build               playback
  ┌────────┐  store    ┌──────────┐  stamped   ┌──────────┐
  │  File  │ ───────▶  │ Backend  │ ─ link ──▶ │   CDN    │
  │ Thunder│  to MinIO │ signs    │            │ validates│
  └────────┘           └──────────┘            └────┬─────┘
                       secret ▲                      │ first view
                       Vault  └──────── same ────────┘ fetch+cache
                                       secret           from MinIO

Tamper resistance (why a stripped/edited link fails):

Forging anything requires the secret, which never leaves backend + CDN. Protect the secret (Vault) and the whole scheme holds.

You don't write the HMAC. The MinIO SDK (or CDN signer) does it in one call:

// ── Mint a signed delivery URL ──
String url = minioClient.getPresignedObjectUrl(
    GetPresignedObjectUrlArgs.builder()
        .method(Method.GET)
        .bucket(bucket)
        .object(objectKey)
        .expiry(seconds, TimeUnit.SECONDS)   // → x-expires + x-sig
        .build());

10. URL Strategy

Tier 1 — trivial public → permanent, unsigned, cache hard

https://media.nexgate.co/profiles/usr_123/avatar_400.webp
https://media.nexgate.co/posts/usr_123/vid_789/thumbnail.webp

Cache-Control: public, max-age=31536000. Scraping these gains nothing.

Tier 2 — public content → signed, short-ish expiry

https://media.nexgate.co/posts/usr_123/vid_789/720p_clean.mp4?x-expires=1780297200&x-sig=8f3a9c

Tier 3 — private / paid → signed + user-bound + auth check first

https://media.nexgate.co/private/messages/conv_abc/file_789/original.jpg
   ?x-expires=...&x-sig=...&x-uid=usr_xyz

[v2 FIX] Domain is .co. All URLs use media.nexgate.co. v1 mixed .com/.co — that produces broken links. One domain everywhere.

[v2 FIX] Cache-key gotcha. Never let the CDN cache a signed object using a cache key that includes x-sig/x-uid — you'd fragment cache per user, and a cached object can outlive its stamp (origin checks expiry, but a cache hit never reaches origin). Rules: tier 1 cache hard; tier 2 cache by path only (strip query from cache key), short edge TTL; tier 3 never on shared cache.

Signed URL params

Param Purpose
x-expires link dies after TTL
x-sig HMAC tamper protection
x-uid bound to user (tier 3) — shared link won't work for someone else

Who generates / validates

Backend (has secret) generates. Cloudflare edge (same secret) validates. MinIO never seen by clients.

11. Streaming Token Strategy: MP4 vs HLS [v2 — new]

Expiry is checked when each request opens, not continuously. An in-flight transfer completes even if the clock passes mid-download. The two formats differ because of how many requests a single playback makes.

  SHORT MP4                        LONG HLS
  one request                      hundreds of requests
  ┌──────────┐                     ┌──────────┐  ┌──┬──┬──┬──┐
  │ 720p.mp4 │  ← 1 signed URL     │master.m3u│─▶│ts│ts│ts│..│
  └──────────┘     few-hr TTL      └──────────┘  └──┴──┴──┴──┘
  opens once,                      short token     long token
  rides to end                     (~1 min)        (> video len)
                                   per-session      one, shared

Short video (MP4) — one signed URL

One file = one request (or a few byte-ranges, all opened up front). A few-hour expiry is plenty; the in-flight request completes, so mid-play expiry basically never happens. → mint one signed URL per rung, few-hour TTL. No dual-token, no single-use.

Long video (HLS) — dual-token (or prefix-signed)

HLS = hundreds of segment requests (one every ~2s), so expiry is re-checked constantly. A single short token would die mid-video. Industry-standard fix (Google Media CDN / CloudFront):

At our stage on Cloudflare Free/Pro, do the simpler version: backend mints a long prefix-signed token for the whole hls/ folder when the post loads. Graduate to true edge dual-token (short→long exchange) if/when we move to a heavier CDN.

Single-use — downloads ONLY, never streams

A stream is many requests; making the token single-use would 403 the viewer one segment in. Streams use short expiry + x-uid binding instead. Single-use (Redis) is correct only for one-file-one-request downloads (§12, digital products).

Edge case (both formats)

User pauses past expiry, then seeks → player fires a fresh request with a dead URL → 403. Client safety net: catch the 403, silently re-fetch a fresh URL from backend, resume.

Short MP4 Long HLS
Requests / play one (few byte-ranges) hundreds
Token single signed URL dual-token / prefix-signed
TTL few hours > watch duration
Single-use no no

12. Watermark & Download Path [v2 FIX]

Decision: Option B — downloads are watermarked. (Full build, not the launch shortcut.)

The feed NEVER contains a watermarked URL. Feed = clean playback URLs only. Watermarked download is a separate endpoint, minted on tap.

User taps Download
  → GET /media/{fileId}/download?quality=720p   (quality optional, default 720p)
  → backend: check canDownload (post setting) + tier (private/paid → auth check)
  → mint signed URL → {quality}_watermarked.mp4
       short TTL (~10 min), x-uid bound, single-use (Redis x-once)
  → log download event (orderId/buyerId/ip/device/country if digital)
  → return { downloadUrl, expiresIn, singleUse: true }
Client downloads. URL marked used in Redis → 403 on reuse.

Default quality, no picker (short video). Serve one default rung (720p) — matches TikTok/IG, sane on TZ data. Endpoint takes optional quality so a picker is an additive change later (long-form only, where the size gap matters).

Storage decision: store one watermarked rung (720p), not all three. If a picker is added later, lazy-generate other rungs on first request and cache — only spend CPU/storage on a quality someone actually downloads.

Timing: watermarked 720p is generated at processing time (pre-ready), so download is instant — no first-user FFmpeg penalty.

// ── Download endpoint (picker-ready, single-use, watermarked) ──
@GetMapping("/media/{fileId}/download")
ResponseEntity<?> download(@PathVariable String fileId,
                           @RequestParam(defaultValue = "720p") String quality,
                           @AuthenticationPrincipal AccountEntity user) {
    MediaEntity m = mediaService.findReady(fileId);

    // ── access gate (tier 2 = open; tier 3 = ownership/visibility) ──
    if (!m.isCanDownload())                 return ResponseEntity.status(403).build();
    if (m.isRestricted() && !accessService.canAccess(user, m))
                                            return ResponseEntity.status(403).build();

    // ── mint watermarked, user-bound, single-use URL ──
    String key = m.watermarkedKey(quality);                 // lazy-generate if absent
    String url = mediaService.mintDownloadUrl(key, user.getId(), Duration.ofMinutes(10));
    downloadLog.record(fileId, user, request);              // audit
    return ResponseEntity.ok(Map.of("downloadUrl", url, "expiresIn", 600, "singleUse", true));
}

13. Feed Response Shape [v2 — new]

Rules baked in:

{
  "data": [{
    "id": "0e67aef4-...",
    "author": {
      "id": "ad03431a-...", "userName": "juliusdev_", "verified": true,
      "profilePictureUrl": "https://media.nexgate.co/profiles/ad03431a-.../avatar_400.webp"
    },
    "content": "Testing video media post 🎬",
    "shareCode": "waBbP82h",
    "media": [{
      "id": "436bb62b-...",
      "mediaType": "VIDEO",
      "status": "READY",
      "width": 1080, "height": 1920, "aspectRatio": "9:16", "duration": 28,
      "isReelEligible": true,
      "streamingFormat": "MP4",
      "canDownload": true,
      "dominantColor": "#1a1a2e",
      "blurhash": "L6Pj0^i_.AyE_3t7t7R**0o#DgR4",
      "lqip": "...",
      "poster":    "https://media.nexgate.co/posts/ad03431a-.../436bb62b-.../thumbnail.webp",
      "preview3s": "https://media.nexgate.co/posts/ad03431a-.../436bb62b-.../preview_3s.mp4",
      "variants": {
        "360p":  "https://media.nexgate.co/posts/ad03431a-.../436bb62b-.../360p_clean.mp4?x-expires=1780297200&x-sig=a1f2b3",
        "720p":  "https://media.nexgate.co/posts/ad03431a-.../436bb62b-.../720p_clean.mp4?x-expires=1780297200&x-sig=b2e3c4",
        "1080p": "https://media.nexgate.co/posts/ad03431a-.../436bb62b-.../1080p_clean.mp4?x-expires=1780297200&x-sig=c3f4d5"
      },
      "order": 1
    }],
    "privacySettings": { "visibility": "PUBLIC" }
  }]
}

(HLS video: streamingFormat: "HLS", replace variants with a single signed/prefix-signed master.m3u8.)

14. Security & Anti-Scraping [v2 — expanded]

14.1 Close the visibility-bypass hole

v1's permanent unsigned URLs meant a PRIVATE post's bytes were reachable by anyone with the link — the API hid the post, the file did not. Fix:

  1. Remove public-read from MinIO buckets (already a stated rule — enforce it).
  2. Route all access through signed CDN URLs.
  3. Private/followers/DM/paid → tier 3 (auth check before minting + x-uid). After this, a hidden post's media returns 403 to anyone but the authorized viewer.

14.2 Two layers, both required

14.3 Bot gate (the missing half) — sized to moat (§30)

Build depth depends on the moat decision (§30). Commerce-moat → lighter bot gate is fine for launch. Content-moat → invest earlier.

14.4 Protection layers (reference)

Content-Disposition: inline · dynamic URL via JS · signed expiring URLs · session/device binding · disable right-click (frontend) · watermark on download · HLS chunking.

15. OG (Open Graph) Strategy

OG images + og_preview.mp4 are permanent, unsigned, tier 1 — because crawlers (WhatsApp/Telegram) fetch on share and the user may open hours later; a signed URL would expire → "Error loading." Access control for private posts is enforced server-side (the post page returns 403), not via the OG asset. Serve og_clean.webp to known platforms, og_play.webp (burned play button) to unknown crawlers (User-Agent detection).

16. Compression & Transcoding (reference)

Client: light pre-compress (max 1080p, CRF 18, never upscale). Server: FFprobe → adaptive ladder (never upscale, never inflate → -c:v copy if output > input). CRF 21/23/25/28 for 1080/720/480/360, 30 for OG preview. 1080p max (all platforms serve ≤1080p anyway). -movflags +faststart always; frag_keyframe+empty_moov+faststart for fMP4. Now: H.264 + AAC. Future: AV1 + Opus + CMAF.

17. BlurHash, LQIP & Dominant Color

Generated for every image + video thumbnail, at processing time. Progressive load: dominantColor (0ms) → BlurHash (0ms) → LQIP (0ms) → thumb.webp (CDN) → full on tap. All three stored in media_content_signals and shipped inline in the feed JSON.

18. Deduplication

SHA-256 on raw file → file_hashes. Exists+clean → skip processing, reference existing variants, reference_count++. Delete → decrement; 0 → remove from MinIO. Near-dup (pHash) = future (copyright).

19. Quota Management

Enforced at presigned-URL generation (atomic SQL). Social = original size charged; digital = all stored bytes. Plans: FREE 1GB / PRO 20GB / BUSINESS 100GB. Warn 80%/95%/100%. Release on abandoned (immediate) and hard-delete (30d after soft). Redis cache, sync to PG every 5 min.

20. Storage Lifecycle

raw: auto-delete 24h. public: keep forever, access-based tiering (hot NVMe → warm HDD → cold; viral old content auto-promotes). private: DM 1y, audio 24h, KYC per law. digital: forever. Soft delete → 30d grace → hard delete + Cloudflare purge + quota free.

21. Abandoned Upload Handling

Layer 1: client confirm (fast path). Layer 2: cleanup job every 30 min (PENDING >1h → file exists = recover/process; not = abandoned, release quota). Layer 3: raw lifecycle 24h. fileId in object key enables recovery without confirm. Redis distributed lock on the job.

22. Progress Tracking (SSE)

SSE (one-way, auto-reconnect, resilient on TZ networks). Redis key upload_status:{fileId}: PENDING→UPLOADING→UPLOADED→SCANNING→PROCESSING→LIVE_PARTIAL→READY (or FAILED/QUARANTINED/ ABANDONED). Multi-instance via Redis Pub/Sub bridging emitters.

23. Communication Architecture

No direct HTTP between services. RabbitMQ (FT ↔ Main Backend, topic nexgate.media): media.upload.request, media.upload.url.ready, media.ready, media.live.partial, media.failed, media.quarantined, digital.product.ready. Kafka (FT → Rec Engine / Analytics, topic content.new).

[v2 FIX] Events carry objectKeys + variants, not signed URLs. MEDIA_READY ships storage keys (e.g. posts/usr_123/vid_789/720p_clean.mp4) + placeholders. The Main Backend mints signed URLs per feed request from those keys — it never stores a signed URL.

24. CDN Strategy

Cloudflare in front of MinIO. First request → edge → MinIO → cache → serve; thereafter from cache. Cache-Control: tier 1 = 1y; tier 2 = path-keyed short edge TTL; tier 3 / API = private, no-store. MinIO never publicly exposed (only Cloudflare IPs). Phases: Free → Pro ($20) → R2 (zero egress). See §10 cache-key gotcha.

Client-side nexgate.co/reels/{shareCode}?ref=whatsapp. No uid in URL (server resolves owner from shareCode → follow prompt). ref drives share analytics. Public content = no token needed for the page; the media on the page still follows tier rules (§8).

26. Technology Stack

Java 21 / Spring Boot 3.x · FFmpeg (Jaffree) · ImageMagick (IM4Java) · blurhash-java · ClamAV (Docker, TCP 3310) · MinIO · Cloudflare · RabbitMQ · Kafka · Redis · PostgreSQL · TUS · Vault (vault.qbitspark.com) — holds the signing secret · Docker Compose · SSE.

27. Database Schema (key tables + v2 notes)

media_files (
  file_id UUID PK, owner_id UUID, directory ENUM, original_name TEXT,
  object_key TEXT,          -- canonical storage key  [v2: keys, never signed URLs]
  mime_type TEXT, file_size BIGINT,
  status ENUM,              -- PENDING..READY..QUARANTINED..ABANDONED
  variants JSONB,           -- variant object_keys (NOT URLs)
  metadata JSONB, scan_result TEXT, hash TEXT,
  is_reel_eligible BOOLEAN, streaming_format ENUM,
  can_download BOOLEAN DEFAULT true,   -- [v2] drives feed canDownload + download gate
  created_at TIMESTAMPTZ, ready_at TIMESTAMPTZ
);

media_content_signals (
  file_id UUID FK, has_audio BOOLEAN, audio_ref TEXT,
  dominant_color TEXT, blurhash TEXT, lqip TEXT,
  aspect_ratio TEXT, quality_score INT, width INT, height INT, duration_seconds DECIMAL
);

-- user_storage_quota, file_hashes, media_variants (HOT/WARM/COLD),
-- digital_product_files, digital_orders, digital_download_logs  (as v1)

Indexes: idx_media_cleanup (created_at) WHERE status='PENDING'; unique file_hashes(hash); media_files(owner_id, status, created_at DESC).

[v2 FIX] No signed_url column anywhere. Signed URLs are minted per request and discarded. The DB stores only object_key + variants (keys).

28. Docker & Infrastructure (reference)

eclipse-temurin:21 + ffmpeg + imagemagick(+webp/heic). ClamAV separate container (daemon, auto-updates). FT: 4 cores / 16GB (FFmpeg CPU-heavy). ClamAV: 1 core / 2GB. Env: PG, Redis, RabbitMQ, Kafka, MinIO, ClamAV, VAULT_ADDR.

29. What File Thunder Does NOT Do

❌ ML/AI classification · Whisper (Rec Engine) · CLIP · feed ranking · social graph · payments · auth · push · search · business logic · fan-out · recommendations. Extracts audio.wav temporarily; Rec Engine fetches/transcribes/deletes. FT never knows audio content.

30. Open Decisions (parked)

  1. Moat: content vs commerce? This drives §14.3 (bot-gate depth) and §8 (how hard to stamp tier-2 public media). If commerce is the moat (shops/payments/events), public media scraping hurts less → lighter bot gate, tier-2 stamping is softer/optional. If content is the moat → invest in bot gate + stamp tier-2 firmly. Decide before finalizing anti-scraping work.
  2. Bot gate depth for launch — minimum: login + rate limit. Full app-attestation later, sized to (1).
  3. HLS dual-token vs prefix-sign for launch — prefix-sign on Cloudflare now; edge dual-token if/when heavier CDN (§11).
  4. Download quality picker — default 720p now; picker + lazy-gen later (§12).

Summary — File Thunder v2 in one line

Receives raw files → ClamAV → processes into clean + watermarked variants (FFmpeg/IM) with blurhash/lqip/dominant-color → stores object keys across 4 buckets in MinIO (never public-read) → the Main Backend mints signed delivery URLs per request from those keys using a three-tier policy (trivial-public unsigned, public-content signed, private/paid signed + auth) → Cloudflare serves and caches by tier → streams use MP4-single-URL or HLS-dual-token, downloads use single-use watermarked URLs → signed URLs + a bot gate together make scraping not worth the effort — all without business logic, ML, or social ops.

File Thunder Architecture Guide v2.0 — NexGate / QBIT SPARK v2 integrates media-security design review. [v2 FIX] tags mark every change from v1.

Revision #1
Created 29 May 2026 10:22:23 by Admin Qbit
Updated 29 May 2026 10:22:44 by Admin Qbit