

Devices Handling

- [JikoXpress Pro Device & Staff Authentication Specification](#)

JikoXpress Pro Device & Staff Authentication Specification

Device-first. PIN-based staff auth. Server is always the authority.
One device, one kitchen. Trust earned through physical registration.

Philosophy

- **Device identity first** — no device, no access. Period.
- **Server is always authority** — device only reacts, never decides
- **Minimal local storage** — only what is necessary lives on device
- **Progressive trust** — setup token → device token → staff token
- **Config as source of truth** — everything including kitchenId lives in one payload
- **Revocation is the kill switch** — no rotation complexity, owner revokes when needed
- **Device type drives auth requirements** — KIOSK needs less, POS needs more

Actor Overview

Actor	Who They Are	How They Auth
Platform Super Admin	QBIT SPARK team	Separate system — out of scope here
Kitchen Owner / Admin	Restaurant owner	Email + Password → Owner JWT
Device	Physical tablet / POS / kiosk	Setup flow → DEVICE_TOKEN
Staff	Kitchen employee	PIN on registered device → STAFF_TOKEN
Customer (Kiosk)	Walk-in customer	No auth — device auth is enough

Token Types

Token	Lifespan	Purpose	Issued At
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<code>setupToken</code>	5 mins, single use	Binds physical device to claim attempt	<code>GET /devices/setup/token</code>
<code>DEVICE_TOKEN</code>	Permanent until revoked	Device identity on every request	After owner configures device
<code>STAFF_TOKEN</code>	8 hrs (one shift)	Staff session, device-bound	<code>POST /auth/staff/login</code>
<code>OWNER_TOKEN</code>	Standard session	Owner management access	<code>POST /auth/owner/login</code>

Device Types & Auth Requirements

Device Type	<code>DEVICE_TOKEN</code>	<code>STAFF_TOKEN</code>	Notes
<code>POS</code>	<input type="checkbox"/> Required	<input type="checkbox"/> Required	Full staff auth
<code>STORE_TABLET</code>	<input type="checkbox"/> Required	<input type="checkbox"/> Required	Full staff auth
<code>KIOSK</code>	<input type="checkbox"/> Required	<input type="checkbox"/> Not needed	Customer self-service
<code>KITCHEN_DISPLAY</code>	<input type="checkbox"/> Required	<input type="checkbox"/> Not needed	Passive display only

Device Type	<code>DEVICE_TOKEN</code>	<code>STAFF_TOKEN</code>	Notes
<code>POS</code>	<input type="checkbox"/> Required	<input type="checkbox"/> Required	Full staff auth
<code>STORE_TABLET</code>	<input type="checkbox"/> Required	<input type="checkbox"/> Required	Full staff auth
<code>KITCHEN_DISPLAY</code>	<input type="checkbox"/> Required	<input type="checkbox"/> Required	Station-bound staff auth
<code>KIOSK</code>	<input type="checkbox"/> Required	<input type="checkbox"/> Not needed	Customer self-service only

`KIOSK` is the only device type with no staff auth. Kitchen can have multiple KDS devices — one per station.

Config Payload — Single Source of Truth

Everything the device needs to know lives in one JSON payload. `kitchenId` is not stored separately — it is a field inside this payload.

```
{
  "deviceId": "dv_uuid",
  "deviceName": "Front Kiosk",
```

```
"deviceType": "KIOSK",
"kitchenId": "kt_uuid",
"kitchenName": "Mama Pima Kitchen",
"deviceStatus": "ACTIVE",
"permissions": {
  "allowDineIn": true,
  "allowPickup": true,
  "allowDelivery": false,
  "allowPOS": false,
  "allowReports": false,
  "allowKitchenDisplay": true,
  "allowStoreAccess": false
}
}
```

Config Hash

Hash is **always derived on the fly** from the full config payload. It is never stored as a static field.

```
hash(configPayload) → compare with hash in response
→ match → config still fresh, proceed
→ mismatch → pull fresh config, overwrite local payload, re-derive
```

What Device Stores Locally

```
LOCAL DEVICE STORE
├─ deviceToken → permanent identity
├─ configPayload → full JSON blob above (kitchenId lives here)
```

Nothing else. No separate kitchenId field. No separate hash field.

Device Status Lifecycle

```
UNCONFIGURED → claimed by owner, awaiting kitchen assignment
ACTIVE → fully configured, operating normally
SUSPENDED → kitchen subscription lapsed / unpaid
REVOKED → decommissioned or compromised
```

Device Reaction Per Status

Status	Device Behaviour
ACTIVE	Check configHash → proceed normally
SUSPENDED	Lock screen → show "Kitchen subscription inactive. Contact admin."
REVOKED	Wipe all local storage → reset to setup/QR screen

Device does **not** need to know *why* it is suspended or revoked. It just reacts. The reason lives server-side.

Every API Response Envelope

Every response to a device — from boot config pull to mid-session requests — carries:

```
{
  "deviceStatus": "ACTIVE",
  "configHash": "a3f9c2d1...",
  "data": { }
}
```

Device reads `deviceStatus` and `configHash` on **every** response before processing `data`.

Device Fingerprint

Generated on the device from hardware/software attributes:

```
fingerprint = hash(
  deviceModel +
  osVersion +
  screenResolution +
  installationId    ← generated once on first app install, stored permanently
)
```

`installationId` is the anchor — generated once, never changes unless app is reinstalled.

When Fingerprint Is Used

```
GET /devices/setup/token    → sent in header (binding moment)
Polling /setup/status       → sent while waiting for CLAIMED only
                             polling stops the moment CLAIMED detected
```

Everything after CLAIMED → fingerprint NOT needed

Everything after DEVICE_TOKEN is issued → fingerprint NOT needed

Fingerprint is **never** included in the QR code. It travels only in request headers, never exposed visually.

Flow 1 — Device Setup & Registration

```
| Device boots. No DEVICE_TOKEN in local storage. |
```

|
|

▼

```
Show "Authenticate Device" screen
[Single button: Set Up Device]
```

|

▼ (user taps button)

```
QR page opens
Device sends fingerprint to server
```

|

▼

```
| GET /devices/setup/token |
| Header: X-Device-Fingerprint: fp_xxxx |
| | |
| Server: |
| → generates cryptographically random setupToken |
| → stores { setupToken, fingerprint, TTL: 5mins } |
| → returns setupToken |
```

|
|



Device renders QR containing:

```
{ "setupToken": "abc123xyz..." }
```

(fingerprint NOT in QR)




Device polls every 5 seconds for CLAIMED only:

```

| GET /devices/setup/status |
| Header: X-Device-Fingerprint: fp_xxxx |
| Header: X-Setup-Token: abc123xyz |
| | |
| Possible responses: |
| { "status": "PENDING" } → keep showing QR |
| { "status": "CLAIMED" } → admin scanned → STOP |
| { "status": "EXPIRED" } → refresh QR |

```



EXPIRED

▼

Fetch new setupToken
Re-render QR

CLAIMED

▼

STOP polling completely
Show "Complete Setup" screen
(admin is now configuring on their phone)



▼ (user taps button)

GET /devices/setup/complete
Header: X-Device-Fingerprint
Header: X-Setup-Token



CONFIGURED NOT YET

▼ ▼

Server returns Show:

```
DEVICE_TOKEN    "Admin hasn't finished.  
+ configPayload Try again in a moment."  
    |           [Try Again]  
    ▼  
Device stores:  
- DEVICE_TOKEN  
- configPayload  
Derives configHash  
setupToken destroyed server-side  
    |  
    ▼  
Navigate to PIN screen ✓
```

Incomplete Registration — Admin Abandons Mid-Flow

Three scenarios handled gracefully:

Scenario A – Admin never scanned (setupToken expired)

- Device still on QR screen
- Poll detects EXPIRED
- Device auto-fetches new setupToken, re-renders QR
- Admin can scan fresh anytime ✓

Scenario B – Admin scanned but never finished configuring, setupToken expired

- Device on "Complete Setup" screen
- User taps button next day
- Server: setupToken expired → error returned
- Device shows: "Setup session expired. Ask your admin to scan again."
[Generate New QR]
- Device returns to QR screen with fresh setupToken
- Admin scans again, configures, done ✓

Scenario C – Admin fully configured, device never tapped "Complete Setup"

- Device on "Complete Setup" screen
- User taps button the next day
- Server: device is CONFIGURED → returns DEVICE_TOKEN + configPayload
- Works perfectly ✓
- CONFIGURED state has no expiry – safe to complete anytime

Flow 2 — Owner Claims & Configures Device (Admin App)

Owner opens admin app on phone

Navigates to Devices → Add Device

|



Owner scans QR on device screen

Admin app reads: { setupToken }

|



```
| POST /devices/claim |
| Header: Authorization: Bearer <OWNER_TOKEN> |
| Body: { "setupToken": "abc123xyz" } |
| |
| Server validates: |
| → setupToken exists and not expired? |
| → setupToken not already used? |
| → fingerprint on file matches device polling? |
| → requester is a valid kitchen owner? |
| → all yes → device status: UNCONFIGURED |
```

|



Admin app shows device configuration screen:

```
[ - - - - - ]
```

Device Claimed ✓

Now configure it

KIOSK · Mama Pima Kitchen ← read-only, from device + session

Device Name

```
| Front Kiosk |
```

Permissions

Dine In [ON]
Pickup [ON]
Delivery [OFF]
POS Access [OFF]
Reports [OFF]
Kitchen Display [ON]
Store Access [OFF]

Save & Activate

┌-----┐

|



```
PUT /devices/{deviceId}/configure
Header: Authorization: Bearer <OWNER_TOKEN>
Body: {
  "name": "Front Kiosk",
  "permissions": {
    "allowDineIn": true,
    "allowPickup": true,
    "allowDelivery": false,
    "allowPOS": false,
    "allowReports": false,
    "allowKitchenDisplay": true
  }
}
Server:
→ kitchenId taken from owner session
→ deviceType taken from setupToken record
→ generates DEVICE_TOKEN
→ builds configPayload
→ status → ACTIVE
```

| → signals CONFIGURED on next poll |

|



Device polling detects CONFIGURED
Fetches DEVICE_TOKEN + configPayload
Stores locally, navigates to PIN screen ✓

Flow 3 — Device Boot (Already Registered)

Device boots

|



Check local storage

|

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|

|

NO TOKEN TOKEN FOUND

|

|



Setup GET /devices/{deviceId}/config

Flow Header: X-Device-Token: <DEVICE_TOKEN>

|



Response:

{

 "deviceStatus": "ACTIVE",

 "configHash": "a3f9c2...",

 "config": { ...full configPayload... }

}

|




Device overwrites local configPayload

Derives hash from fresh payload

|

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Flow 4 — Staff Login (POS / STORE_TABLET)

Device on PIN screen

Staff enters PIN

|

▼

POST /auth/staff/login

Header: X-Device-Token: <DEVICE_TOKEN>

Body: { "pin": "1234" }

|

▼

Server:

- identifies kitchen from DEVICE_TOKEN
- checks deviceType – is staff auth required?
- finds staff with matching PIN hash in that kitchen
- validates PIN
- issues STAFF_TOKEN (8hrs, device-bound)
- fetches permissionsHash for this staff member

|

▼

Response:

```
{  
  "deviceStatus": "ACTIVE",  
  "configHash": "a3f9c2...",  
  "staffToken": "eyJ...",  
  "permissionsHash": "b7d1e4..."  
}
```

|



Device fetches staff permissions once:

```
GET /staff/me/permissions
```

```
Header: X-Device-Token + X-Staff-Token
```



Device caches permissions locally for session

```
Effective permissions = staff permissions n device permissions
```



Staff sees their dashboard ✓

PIN Security

Wrong PIN attempt → increment counter on device record

5 wrong attempts → device locked for 15 mins (server-enforced)

Lockout is device-scoped, not global

Correct PIN → counter resets

Staff Session Rules

One active STAFF_TOKEN per device at any time

New PIN login → previous STAFF_TOKEN immediately invalidated

Staff logs out → STAFF_TOKEN invalidated → back to PIN screen

Token expires after 8hrs → back to PIN screen

Flow 5 — Mid-Session Config & Permissions Sync

Every API response carries:

```
{  
  "deviceStatus": "ACTIVE",  
  "configHash": "a3f9c2...",  
  "permissionsHash": "b7d1e4..." ← only when staff session active  
}
```

Device on every response:

Step 1 – Check deviceStatus

- ACTIVE → continue
- SUSPENDED → lock screen immediately
- REVOKED → wipe local storage → setup screen

Step 2 – Check configHash

- matches local derived hash → config still fresh
- mismatch → pull fresh config
GET /devices/{deviceId}/config

Step 3 – Check permissionsHash (if staff session active)

- matches cached hash → permissions still fresh
- mismatch → pull fresh permissions
GET /staff/me/permissions
recalculate effective permissions

Flow 6 — Manual Refresh (Refresh Button on Device)

Staff or admin taps Refresh button on device

|

▼

GET /devices/{deviceId}/config

Header: X-Device-Token: <DEVICE_TOKEN>

|

▼

Same as boot config pull

Device reacts to whatever server returns

(ACTIVE / SUSPENDED / REVOKED)

|

▼

Config updated if hash changed ✓

Useful when owner changes permissions on dashboard and staff need it reflected immediately without waiting for next request.

Flow 7 — Device Revocation (Owner Dashboard)

Owner opens dashboard → Devices → [Device Name] → Revoke

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Revoke Device?

```
[
| [icon] Front Kiosk |
| KIOSK · Last seen |
| 5 mins ago       |
]
```

This device will be immediately
locked and all local data wiped
on its next request.

```
[ Revoke Device ] ← destructive, red
```

```
[ Cancel ]
```

└ - - - - - ┘

|

▼

```
PATCH /devices/{deviceId}/revoke
Header: Authorization: Bearer <OWNER_TOKEN>
```

|

▼

```
Server: device status → REVOKED
```

DEVICE_TOKEN invalidated immediately
All active STAFF_TOKENs on this device killed

|



Device makes next request (any request or refresh)
Response carries: { "deviceStatus": "REVOKED" }

|



Device:
→ deletes DEVICE_TOKEN from local storage
→ deletes configPayload from local storage
→ clears all active staff sessions locally
→ clears any cached order/cart data
→ resets to setup/QR screen ✓

Device owner can now re-register the device
fresh through the QR setup flow

Two Revocation Paths

Source	Endpoint	Confirmation Required
Owner dashboard	<code>PATCH /devices/{id}/revoke</code>	Dashboard UI confirmation
Device itself	<code>POST /devices/self-revoke</code>	Are you sure + kitchen name typed

Both lead to the same outcome — token dead, device wiped, setup screen shown.

Flow 7b — Self-Revoke From Device

Device has a revoke option buried in settings — not on the main PIN screen.

Staff/admin navigates to Settings → Revoke Device

|



Step 1 – Are You Sure? dialog

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Revoke button enabled only when typed name matches
kitchenName from local configPayload exactly
(local string comparison – no server call needed for the check)

|

▼ (taps Revoke Device)

POST /devices/self-revoke

Header: X-Device-Token: <DEVICE_TOKEN>

Body: { "kitchenName": "Mama Pima Kitchen" }

|

▼

Server validates:

- DEVICE_TOKEN valid?
- kitchenName matches kitchen on record for this device?
- yes → marks device REVOKED
 - invalidates DEVICE_TOKEN
 - kills all active STAFF_TOKENs

|

▼

Device:

- wipes all local storage
- resets to setup/QR screen ✓

Flow 8 — Suspension (Subscription Lapsed)

Kitchen subscription expires

Platform marks kitchen as SUSPENDED server-side

All devices belonging to this kitchen → status SUSPENDED

|

▼

Device makes next request

Response: { "deviceStatus": "SUSPENDED" }

|

▼

Device:

- does NOT wipe local storage
- locks screen

→ shows: "Kitchen subscription inactive. Contact your admin."

When kitchen pays and subscription restored:

- Platform marks kitchen ACTIVE
- All devices → ACTIVE
- Next device request returns ACTIVE
- Device unlocks automatically ✓

DEVICE_TOKEN and configPayload are preserved during suspension. Device resumes instantly when restored — no re-registration needed.

Flow 9 — Endpoint Access Control by Device Type

Server enforces device type restrictions on every request:

Request arrives

- extract X-Device-Token
- look up device record → read deviceType
- check: is this deviceType permitted on this endpoint?
- yes → proceed
- no → 403 Forbidden

Endpoint Permission Matrix

Endpoint	POS	STORE_TABLET	KIOSK	KITCHEN_DISPLAY
GET /menu/public	☐	☐	☐	☐
POST /orders	☐	☐	☐	☐
GET /kitchen/display	☐	☐	☐	☐
POST /pos/cash-drawer	☐	☐	☐	☐
GET /reports	☐	☐	☐	☐
POST /kiosk/self-checkout	☐	☐	☐	☐
POST /auth/staff/login	☐	☐	☐	☐

Request Structure Reference

Device-Only Request (KIOSK / KITCHEN_DISPLAY)

Headers:

```
X-Device-Token: <DEVICE_TOKEN>
```

Device + Staff Request (POS / STORE_TABLET)

Headers:

```
X-Device-Token: <DEVICE_TOKEN>
```

```
X-Staff-Token: <STAFF_TOKEN>
```

Server validates:

- DEVICE_TOKEN valid and ACTIVE?
- STAFF_TOKEN valid and not expired?
- STAFF_TOKEN.deviceId === DEVICE_TOKEN.deviceId?
- deviceType requires staff auth?
- all yes → process request

Payload Shapes

DEVICE_TOKEN Payload (JWT)

```
{  
  "deviceId": "dv_uuid",  
  "kitchenId": "kt_uuid",  
  "deviceType": "KIOSK"  
}
```

STAFF_TOKEN Payload (JWT)

```
{
  "staffId": "st_uuid",
  "kitchenId": "kt_uuid",
  "deviceId": "dv_uuid",
  "expiresAt": "2026-05-05T18:00:00Z"
}
```

Permissions are **not** inside the token. They are fetched once per session and cached on device.

Staff Permissions Payload

```
{
  "permissionsHash": "b7d1e4...",
  "permissions": {
    "canViewOrders": true,
    "canManageOrders": true,
    "canViewReports": false,
    "canManageMenu": false,
    "canManageStaff": false,
    "canProcessRefunds": false
  }
}
```

Effective Permissions (Device ? Staff)

```
Device allowReports: false
Staff  canViewReports: true
Effective: CANNOT view reports on this device

Device allowPOS: true
Staff  canProcessRefunds: true
Effective: CAN process refunds on this device
```


Staff can never exceed what the device allows, regardless of their role.

Owner Dashboard — Device Management Screens


Screen 1 — Devices List



Screen 2 — Add Device (QR Scanner)



QR code shown on the device



Make sure the device is showing
its setup QR code

┌-----┐

Screen 3 — Configure Device (After Scan)

┌-----┐

Device Claimed ✓

Now configure it

KIOSK · Mama Pima Kitchen ← read-only

Device Name

```
[
| Front Kiosk
|
]
```

Permissions

Dine In [ON]

Pickup [ON]

Delivery [OFF]

POS Access [OFF]

Reports [OFF]

Kitchen Display [ON]

Store Access [OFF]

Save & Activate

Screen 4 — Device Detail

← Front Kiosk

Status ACTIVE

Type KIOSK

Kitchen Mama Pima Kitchen

Last Seen 2 minutes ago

Registered 1 May 2026

Permissions

Dine In [ON]

Pickup [ON]

Delivery [OFF]

POS Access [OFF]

Reports [OFF]


Kitchen Display [ON]

Edit Permissions

Revoke Device


← red, destructive

Screen 5 — Revoke Confirmation



Device Screens (Dotted)

Screen A — Authenticate Device (Unregistered)



This device is not registered

Ask your kitchen admin to
scan the setup code




L - - - - - J

Screen B — QR Code Display

[- - - - -]

[JikoXpress Logo]

Scan this code with the
JikoXpress admin app




Refreshes in 03:47

Waiting for admin to scan...

L - - - - - J


QR refreshes every 5 minutes. Old setupToken is burned on each refresh. Polling runs every 5 seconds **for CLAIMED status only** — stops the moment admin scans.

Screen C — Admin Scanned (Complete Setup)



No polling on this screen. User taps "Complete Setup" manually when admin signals done.

Screen C2 — Complete Setup — Session Expired



Screen C3 — Complete Setup — Admin Not Done Yet

[JikoXpress Logo]

Admin hasn't finished yet

Ask your admin to complete the configuration on their phone then try again.

Try Again

Screen D — PIN Login (Registered Device)

Mama Pima Kitchen
Front Kiosk

Enter your PIN

•	•		
---	---	--	--

1	2	3
---	---	---

Device access revoked

This device has been
deactivated by your admin.

Contact your admin to
re-register this device.

Set Up Device

Endpoint Reference

Device Setup — No Auth

Method	Endpoint	Headers	Body	Returns
GET	/devices/setup/token	X-Device-Fingerprint	—	setupToken
GET	/devices/setup/status	X-Device-Fingerprint , X-Setup-Token	—	{ status }
GET	/devices/setup/complete	X-Device-Fingerprint , X-Setup-Token	—	DEVICE_TOKEN + configPayload

Device Claim & Config — Owner Auth

Method	Endpoint	Headers	Body	Returns
POST	/devices/claim	Authorization: Bearer <OWNER_TOKEN>	{ setupToken }	{ deviceId, status: UNCONFIGURED }
PUT	/devices/{id}/configure	Authorization: Bearer <OWNER_TOKEN>	name, permissions	{ success }
GET	/devices	Authorization: Bearer <OWNER_TOKEN>	—	All devices for owner
PATCH	/devices/{id}/revoke	Authorization: Bearer <OWNER_TOKEN>	—	{ success }
PATCH	/devices/{id}/reactivate	Authorization: Bearer <OWNER_TOKEN>	—	{ success }

Method	Endpoint	Headers	Body	Returns
PUT	/devices/{id}/permissions	Authorization: Bearer <OWNER_TOKEN>	permissions object	{ success }

Device Runtime — Device Auth

Method	Endpoint	Headers	Body	Returns
GET	/devices/{id}/config	X-Device-Token	—	deviceStatus + configHash + configPayload
POST	/devices/self-revoke	X-Device-Token	{ kitchenName }	{ status: REVOKED }

Staff Auth — Device Auth

Method	Endpoint	Headers	Body	Returns
POST	/auth/staff/login	X-Device-Token	{ pin }	STAFF_TOKEN + permissionsHash
GET	/staff/me/permissions	X-Device-Token, X-Staff-Token	—	permissionsHash + permissions
POST	/auth/staff/logout	X-Device-Token, X-Staff-Token	—	{ success }

Security Summary

Threat	Mitigation
Stranger scans QR	Claim requires valid OWNER_TOKEN — scan alone is useless
QR replay attack	setupToken expires in 5 mins, single use, burns on claim
Wrong device claims token	Fingerprint registered at token fetch — mismatch on claim → rejected
Stolen DEVICE_TOKEN	Owner revokes from dashboard → dead on next request
Accidental self-revoke on device	Two-step confirmation + kitchen name typed to confirm
Malicious self-revoke attempt	Server re-validates kitchenName against device record server-side
Staff PIN brute force	5 wrong attempts → 15 min lockout, device-scoped
Stolen STAFF_TOKEN	Device-bound — useless on any other device

Threat	Mitigation
Device deactivated mid-session	deviceStatus in every response → device reacts immediately
Subscription lapse	All kitchen devices suspended automatically — no data lost
Wrong device type hits endpoint	Server reads deviceType from record — 403 if mismatch
Config changed while device offline	Boot always pulls fresh config — guaranteed fresh start
Rooted / jailbroken device	App detects on boot and refuses to run
Token extracted from storage	OS keychain hardware-backed — not extractable even on rooted devices (with detection)

Secure Token Storage — Per Platform

DEVICE_TOKEN must never be stored in plaintext, localStorage, or unencrypted files. Every platform has a secure OS-managed storage mechanism. JikoXpress follows the same pattern used by Spotify, Slack, Discord, and 1Password.

Storage Mechanism Per Platform

Platform	Storage Mechanism	Security Level
Android	Android Keystore System	★★★★ hardware-backed
iOS	Keychain + Secure Enclave	★★★★ hardware-backed
Windows	DPAPI / Credential Manager	★★★★ strong
Mac	macOS Keychain	★★★★ hardware on Apple Silicon
Linux (with keychain)	libsecret → GNOME Keyring / KWallet	★★★★ strong
Linux (headless / no keychain)	Encrypted file, machine-derived key	★★★ acceptable
Web	httpOnly cookie only	★★ acceptable — never localStorage

Cross-Platform Desktop (Electron)

For any Electron-based desktop client, use `keytar` — the same library used by Spotify, Slack, and VS Code:

```
// Store
await keytar.setPassword('JikoXpress', 'deviceToken', token)
```

```
// Retrieve
await keytar.getPassword('JikoXpress', 'deviceToken')

// Delete (on revoke/wipe)
await keytar.deletePassword('JikoXpress', 'deviceToken')
```

`keytar` wraps the OS keychain on all three platforms — one API, three platforms handled transparently.

Linux Fallback (No Keychain Available)

```
Derive encryption key from:
  hash(machineId + username + appSalt)
→ encrypt DEVICE_TOKEN with derived key
→ store encrypted blob in ~/.config/jikoxpress/
→ not hardware-backed but significantly better than plaintext
```

This is the same approach VS Code uses on headless Linux.

What Is Never Acceptable

- Plain text files on filesystem
- localStorage or sessionStorage (web)
- Unencrypted local SQLite
- Hardcoded in config files
- Environment variables on disk
- Shared storage accessible by other apps

Root / Jailbreak Detection

On app boot, before loading any stored token:

```
Android → RootBeer library → detect root
iOS      → DTTJailbreakDetection → detect jailbreak
→ detected → refuse to run
→ show: "This device does not meet security requirements.
        Contact your admin."
```

Compromised OS → secure storage guarantees are void → app must not run.

Managed Device Enforcement

Since JikoXpress devices are business-owned and managed:

```
App enforces on boot:  
→ screen lock must be enabled  
→ if no screen lock → refuse to run  
→ show: "Please enable screen lock to use JikoXpress"
```

Physical access without screen lock is the simplest attack vector. Eliminating it costs nothing.

Real-Time Architecture — WebSocket + STOMP

What Needs Real-Time

```
Kitchen devices (KDS, POS, STORE_TABLET):
```

- New order arrived (from any channel)
- Order status changed
- Order ready for pickup/delivery

```
Customer app:
```

- Order confirmed
- Order being prepared
- Driver assigned
- Driver location (live map)
- Order delivered

```
Driver app:
```

- New delivery assigned
- Route updates

```
Platform dashboard (super admin):
```

- Live orders across all kitchens

- Live driver positions
- Alerts on stuck orders

Protocol Decision

Protocol	Order Events	Driver Location	Verdict
STOMP over WebSocket	☐ perfect fit	⚠ works but heavy	Use for events
Raw WebSocket	☐ works	☐ perfect fit	Use for location
MQTT	☐ overkill	☐ strong but needs broker + separate auth per client	Not used

MQTT rejected — every mobile client (driver app, customer app) would need separate MQTT broker credentials, creating a second auth system alongside JikoXpress auth. Not worth it.

Final stack:

- STOMP over WebSocket → order events, notifications, status updates
- Raw WebSocket → driver location streaming (high frequency)
- Auth for both → existing DEVICE_TOKEN / user JWT in headers
- No MQTT → credential complexity not justified

Topic Design (STOMP)

- /topic/kitchen/{kitchenId}/orders → KDS, POS, STORE_TABLET
- /topic/kitchen/{kitchenId}/order/{id} → specific order status updates
- /topic/order/{orderId}/tracking → customer tracks their order
- /topic/platform/dashboard → super admin live view

Server assigns topic subscriptions based on `deviceType` — device cannot self-subscribe to unauthorized topics.

Raw WebSocket (Driver Location)

- Driver app → /ws/location (raw WebSocket)
- sends GPS coordinates every 3 seconds
- socket server broadcasts to:
 - /topic/order/{orderId}/tracking → customer
 - kitchen dashboard → kitchen
 - platform dashboard → super admin

Scaling Architecture (Phased)

Phase 1 – v1 (now):

- STOMP embedded directly in main Spring Boot
- kitchen order events only
- zero extra infrastructure


Phase 2 – delivery launches:

- extract dedicated Socket Server (separate Spring Boot service)
- RabbitMQ between main backend and socket server
- main backend publishes events → RabbitMQ → socket server → devices
- raw WebSocket for driver location on same socket server
- STOMP for all other events

Phase 3 – scale:

- socket server scales horizontally
- RabbitMQ fans out across all socket server instances
- device clients unchanged – same STOMP protocol

Phase 2+ architecture:



Missed Message Recovery

STOMP does not retain messages. On reconnect each device fetches missed events:

KDS reconnects

- GET /kitchen/orders?since={lastReceivedAt}&station=GRILL

POS reconnects

→ GET /kitchen/pos/orders?since={lastReceivedAt}

Customer app reconnects

→ GET /orders/{orderId}/status

No messages lost. Gap filled on reconnect via REST fallback.

File Structure —

kitchen_service/devices/

Base package: `org.qbithubpark.jikoxpresspro`

```
kitchen_service/  
└─ devices/  
    |  
    └─ device_mng/  
        | └─ entity/  
        |     └─ DeviceEntity.java  
        | └─ enums/  
        |     └─ DeviceType.java  
        |     └─ DeviceStatus.java  
        | └─ payload/  
        |     └─ DeviceSetupTokenResponse.java  
        |     └─ DeviceSetupStatusResponse.java  
        |     └─ DeviceClaimRequest.java  
        |     └─ DeviceConfigureRequest.java  
        |     └─ DeviceConfigPayload.java  
        |     └─ DevicePermissionsPayload.java  
        |     └─ DeviceResponse.java  
        |     └─ DeviceSummaryResponse.java  
        | └─ repo/  
        |     └─ DeviceRepo.java  
        | └─ service/  
        |     └─ DeviceService.java  
        |     └─ impl/  
        |         └─ DeviceServiceImpl.java
```

```

|   └─ controller/
|   |   └─ DeviceSetupController.java      ← setup/claim/complete (no auth)
|   |   └─ DeviceManagementController.java ← owner dashboard endpoints
|   └─ mapper/
|       └─ DeviceMapper.java
|
└─ device_auth/
    └─ entity/
        └─ StaffSessionEntity.java
    └─ enums/
        └─ StaffTokenStatus.java
    └─ payload/
        └─ StaffLoginRequest.java
        └─ StaffLoginResponse.java
        └─ StaffPermissionsPayload.java
        └─ DeviceAuthResponse.java      ← wrapper with deviceStatus + configHash
    └─ repo/
        └─ StaffSessionRepo.java
    └─ service/
        └─ DeviceAuthService.java
        └─ impl/
            └─ DeviceAuthServiceImpl.java
    └─ controller/
        └─ DeviceAuthController.java
|
└─ device_config/
    └─ payload/
        └─ DeviceRuntimeResponse.java    ← envelope every response carries
    └─ service/
        └─ DeviceConfigService.java
        └─ impl/
            └─ DeviceConfigServiceImpl.java

```

Package Responsibilities

```

device_mng    → device lifecycle – setup, claim, configure, revoke, list
device_auth   → staff PIN login, session management, permissions
device_config → shared runtime envelope (deviceStatus + configHash)
                also handles boot config pull

```

`DeviceAuthResponse` is the shared wrapper every device endpoint returns — not just auth endpoints. It wraps the endpoint `data` alongside `deviceStatus` and `configHash`.

Future Scope — KDS Advanced Configuration

“ ⚠ This section is documented for memory and future planning. Not part of v1 build scope.

Multiple KDS devices are fully supported by the current auth design — each KDS is a separate registered device with its own `DEVICE_TOKEN` and staff auth. What changes in future scope is the **configuration depth** of what each KDS shows and how it behaves.

KDS Station Assignment (v1 — Basic)

Currently `deviceName` (e.g. "Grill Station") is the only station identifier. Enough for v1.

KDS Advanced Config (Future)

Each KDS will have a `kdsConfig` block inside its `configPayload` covering:

What to show:

```
station          → GRILL / FRYER / COLD / DRINKS / BAKERY / EXPO / PASS
showByCategories → ["MAINS", "STARTERS"] – filter by menu category
showByFulfillment → DINE_IN / DELIVERY / PICKUP / ALL
showByChannel    → ALL or specific channels (App, POS, Kiosk, WhatsApp)
```

Display algorithm:

```
sortAlgorithm    → FIFO / PRIORITY / BY_TABLE / FULFILLMENT_FIRST
gridColumns      → 4 / 6 / 8 (how many orders visible at once)
cardDetail       → COMPACT / FULL (item name only vs full modifiers + notes)
fontSize         → SMALL / MEDIUM / LARGE
```

Timing & alerts:

```
alertYellowAfterMins → order turns yellow after X mins
alertRedAfterMins    → order turns red after Y mins
soundOnNewOrder      → true / false
soundOnCritical       → true / false
```

Station coordination:

```
expoMode              → this KDS sees ALL stations, coordinates completion
showSiblingStationStatus → show mini progress of other stations on same order
autoBumpOnAllStationsDone → auto-move order to READY when all stations done
```

Future Config Payload Shape (KDS)

```
{
  "deviceType": "KITCHEN_DISPLAY",
  "deviceName": "Grill Station",
  "station": "GRILL",
  "kdsConfig": {
    "showByCategories": ["MAINS", "STARTERS"],
    "showByFulfillment": ["DINE_IN", "PICKUP"],
    "showByChannel": ["ALL"],
    "sortAlgorithm": "FIFO",
    "gridColumns": 4,
    "cardDetail": "FULL",
    "fontSize": "MEDIUM",
    "alertYellowAfterMins": 8,
    "alertRedAfterMins": 15,
    "soundOnNewOrder": true,
    "soundOnCritical": true,
    "expoMode": false,
    "showSiblingStationStatus": true,
    "autoBumpOnAllStationsDone": false
  }
}
```

All of this will live inside configPayload — hash-monitored, server-controlled, no app update needed when owner changes KDS settings from dashboard.

Real World KDS Setups

Small kitchen (1 KDS)

→ One screen, shows everything, chef manages all

Medium kitchen (2-3 KDS)

→ Grill Station → grill items only

→ Fryer Station → fryer items only

→ Cold Station → salads, desserts, drinks

Large kitchen (4+ KDS)

→ All of above plus:

→ Expo Screen → head chef sees ALL orders, coordinates

→ Pass Screen → confirms order complete before handoff to runner